Executive summary
The Horn of Africa remains exposed to simultaneous conflict systems: Sudan's multi-front war, unresolved Ethiopian political and security tensions, Somalia's prolonged contest with Al-Shabaab, and reversible maritime insecurity across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
These theatres are distinct but operationally connected through displacement, port and corridor dependency, mission financing and regional political bargaining. Organisations should avoid treating a national-level rating as a substitute for corridor and district analysis.
Overall confidence is MODERATE. Confidence is high that conflict and humanitarian access constraints will persist; confidence is lower on the timing and scale of any escalation involving Ethiopia and Eritrea or changes in Al-Shabaab territorial control.
Sources · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) · [11] International Crisis Group
Full report
CONFIRMED
OCHA[3] and ReliefWeb reporting confirms that conflict, displacement, food insecurity and funding constraints continue to affect the Horn and neighbouring Sudan and South Sudan. FEWS NET[5] reporting identifies Emergency outcomes and continued famine risk in parts of Darfur and Kordofan during 2026.
International Crisis Group[11] reporting has documented the interaction between Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions and unresolved Tigray arrangements. These sources confirm deterioration in the political-security environment, not that interstate war is inevitable.
US MARAD[14] advisory 2026-006 states that attacks on commercial shipping had paused after the October 2025 ceasefire while warning that residual risk persisted across the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin.
Sources · [13] International Crisis Group · [16] IOM DTM
REPORTED
Somali and regional outlets have reported local Al-Shabaab advances and changing control in parts of central Somalia. Because territorial control can change quickly and access is restricted, individual claims are retained as attributed reporting unless corroborated by additional independent sources.
Analysts and media have described Ethiopia and Eritrea as approaching a possible confrontation over Red Sea access and unresolved Tigray issues. This is a reported risk judgement, not confirmation that either state has decided to initiate war.
Sources · [14] US MARAD · [17] INSO
ASSESSED
Sudan's conflict is likely to remain protracted and to continue transmitting humanitarian and security pressure into neighbouring states. The direction of individual front lines is less certain than the persistence of the conflict system.
In Somalia, gaps between the AUSSOM transition timetable, available financing and Somali force capacity are likely to create local opportunities for Al-Shabaab. Political fragmentation would amplify that exposure.
Renewed major conflict involving Ethiopia, Tigray and Eritrea is a credible high-impact scenario, but available open sources do not establish timing or firm actor intent. Preparedness is warranted; deterministic forecasting is not.
Sources · [10] FEWS NET / ReliefWeb · [13] International Crisis Group
Operational implications
Maintain district-level access plans for Somalia and Ethiopia; review evacuation and hibernation triggers in northern Ethiopia and border areas; preserve alternative supply routes for Djibouti, Berbera and Red Sea-dependent operations; and verify all maritime movement against current official advisories.
Sources · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) · [11] International Crisis Group
Indicators to monitor
Monitor confirmed force movement or clashes in northern Ethiopia; AUSSOM funding and transition milestones; corroborated Al-Shabaab territorial changes; Sudan ceasefire or negotiation initiatives; and new MARAD[14], UKMTO[15] or EUNAVFOR warnings affecting the Red Sea approaches.
Sources · [11] International Crisis Group · [14] US MARAD
Outlook
Most likely through March 2027: continued conflict in Sudan, a contested security equilibrium in Somalia, unresolved Ethiopian tensions and a maritime environment that remains usable under heightened monitoring. The highest-impact alternative is a broader Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation or a severe Somalia transition failure.
Sources · [4] GDACS · [7] GDELT Project
Confidence assessment
MODERATE. Multiple credible sources support the broad trajectory, but access constraints, propaganda, delayed event reporting and opaque state decision-making materially limit precision. Operational users should check time-sensitive claims against current source notices.
Sources · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) · [11] International Crisis Group
Key findings
- Sudan's war remains geographically dispersed and continues to create severe access, displacement and food-security consequences.
- Somalia's security environment remains shaped by Al-Shabaab capability, federal political disputes and the funding and transition conditions around AUSSOM.
- Tensions involving Ethiopia, Tigray and Eritrea remain a high-consequence escalation risk, but actor intent and timing are opaque.
- The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime threat has eased from peak periods but remains reversible at short notice.
Analyst assessment
ASSESSED, HIGH CONFIDENCE: Sudan will remain a protracted conflict and humanitarian emergency through the outlook period, with continued displacement and access constraints even if front lines move.
ASSESSED, MODERATE-HIGH CONFIDENCE: Somalia is likely to remain in a contested equilibrium. AUSSOM financing or transition gaps would increase the probability of local Al-Shabaab gains but would not automatically imply nationwide collapse.
ASSESSED, MODERATE CONFIDENCE: Red Sea shipping risk is conditionally improved but can deteriorate rapidly in response to wider regional escalation.
Key limitation: Eritrean posture, armed-group intent and rapidly changing front lines are difficult to verify in open sources. Scenario language is not a statement of confirmed intent.
Related reports
Footnotes & sources
- [1] ACLED — Armed Conflict Location & Event Data — Africa event recordsL1 Conflict · reliability A
- [2] UCDP — Uppsala Conflict Data Program — organised violence datasetL1 Conflict · reliability A
- [3] UN OCHA / ReliefWeb — Situation reports, access snapshots and humanitarian updatesL2 Early warning · reliability A
- [4] GDACS — Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System alertsL2 Early warning · reliability B
- [5] FEWS NET — Food security outlooks and alertsL2 Early warning · reliability A
- [6] NASA FIRMS / Copernicus — Active fire detections and open satellite imagery for corroborationL3 GEOINT · reliability B
- [7] GDELT Project — Global media event and tone monitoringL5 Strategic · reliability C
- [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) — Regional political and security analysisL5 Strategic · reliability B
- [9] INGO ADVISORY analyst desk — Practitioner interviews, field reporting and imagery verificationL6 Verification · reliability B
- [10] FEWS NET / ReliefWeb — Sudan: Emergency and risk of Famine persist, May–September 2026L2 Early warning · reliability A
- [11] International Crisis Group — Ethiopia and Eritrea Slide Closer to War amid Tigray UpheavalL5 Strategic · reliability B
- [12] International Crisis Group — Helping Somalia Move Beyond a Shaky Status QuoL5 Strategic · reliability B
- [13] International Crisis Group — Security Council Misses Funding Deadline for AU Mission in SomaliaL5 Strategic · reliability B
- [14] US MARAD — Advisory 2026-006 — Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somali BasinL2 Early warning · reliability A
- [15] UKMTO — Maritime incident advisories — Gulf of Aden and Red Sea approachesL2 Early warning · reliability A
- [16] IOM DTM — Displacement Tracking Matrix — movement and displacement flowsL2 Early warning · reliability A
- [17] INSO — NGO safety incident reporting and access advisoriesL1 Conflict · reliability A
Supporting capability statement
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