INGO ADVISORYIndependent Security Intelligence & Risk Analysis

Security management · Journey risk

Most staff exposure sits on the road, not in the office

Journey risk analysis is the discipline of describing a specific route honestly: what threatens it, what the environment does to it, what reduces the risk, and the point at which the movement should not happen at all.

Illustrative analytical example — demonstrates method, not operational guidance for a specific organisation. These are analytical examples, not a commercial movement-management service, and no staff tracking is provided.

Mogadishu → Baidoa

Somalia

SEVEREAn attack is highly likely.

Key threats

  • Armed conflict along contested segments
  • Roadside explosive devices
  • Multiple checkpoints of varying authority
  • Criminal interference and opportunistic theft
  • Poor road condition and vehicle breakdown

Environmental factors

  • Seasonal rain and surface degradation
  • Dust reducing visibility on unsealed sections
  • Limited daylight window for the full leg
  • Patchy mobile coverage between towns

Mitigation considerations

  • Route selection reviewed on the day of travel, not in advance only
  • Departure timing inside an agreed daylight window
  • Redundant communications with a fixed check-in schedule
  • Low-profile vehicle and passenger posture
  • Named journey approver and a written contingency plan

Abort criteria

  • Confirmed hostile activity on the intended segment
  • Loss of communications for longer than the agreed window
  • Checkpoint behaviour indicating a change of control
  • Arrival no longer achievable in daylight

Mogadishu Aden Adde Airport → city

Somalia

SEVEREAn attack is highly likely.

Key threats

  • Complex attack on the arterial road
  • Explosive devices targeting convoys
  • Predictable timing of airport transfers
  • Congestion creating fixed-position exposure

Environmental factors

  • Peak-hour congestion
  • Roadworks changing the route at short notice
  • Heat and vehicle reliability

Mitigation considerations

  • Timing varied and never published in advance
  • Transfer confirmed only once the passenger is on the ground
  • Movement tracking with a receiving-site handover
  • Pre-agreed diversion and shelter points

Abort criteria

  • Road closure or security-force incident on the route
  • Attack reporting within the corridor in the preceding hours
  • Transfer cannot complete before dark

Nairobi → Garissa → Dadaab

Kenya

SUBSTANTIALAn attack is likely.

Key threats

  • Improvised explosive devices on specific segments
  • Cross-border armed-group activity
  • Banditry on isolated stretches
  • Road traffic collision risk at speed

Environmental factors

  • Long distance with limited services
  • Flood damage in the rainy season
  • Wildlife and livestock on carriageways

Mitigation considerations

  • Convoy or escort arrangements where required by policy
  • No night movement
  • Speed and driver-hours discipline
  • Fuel and water self-sufficiency

Abort criteria

  • Recent device incident on the planned segment
  • Escort arrangement unavailable
  • Route flooded or impassable

Port Sudan → inland corridor

Sudan

SEVEREAn attack is highly likely.

Key threats

  • Front-line movement across the corridor
  • Multiple parallel authorities at control points
  • Cargo interference and diversion
  • Detention risk for staff and drivers

Environmental factors

  • Extreme heat
  • Long unsupported distances
  • Fuel scarcity

Mitigation considerations

  • Documentation prepared for every authority on the route
  • Transporter vetting and briefing
  • Staged movement with confirmed reception at each stage
  • Cargo manifest discipline and no dual-use ambiguity

Abort criteria

  • Front-line shift onto the corridor
  • Authority refusing recognised documentation
  • Fuel unavailable for the return leg
Risk assessment methodAccess and corridor statusCrisis and incident management