| SO-EW-01 | Mogadishu · Banadir | Complex attacks on hotels and government compoundsAttacks of this type change where meetings can be held and how visitors are accommodated, more than they change overall threat level. | Two or more reported attacks on hotel or compound targets inside four weeks. | Suspend hotel-based meetings, move to compound venues, and review accommodation used by visiting staff. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-02 | Mogadishu · Airport corridor | Checkpoint and airport-road disruptionThe corridor is the single point almost every international movement passes through, so disruption there affects everyone at once. | Repeated same-week disruption, or any incident inside the corridor itself. | Move airport runs to first light, cut the number of runs, and hold a same-day movement review. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-03 | South-Central corridors | IED incidents on main supply routesRoute IED activity is the clearest signal that overland movement assumptions have gone stale. | Any confirmed device on a route used by programme movement within the previous fortnight. | Stop non-essential road movement on that route, revert to air where available, and re-run the journey risk assessment. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-04 | National | Aid-worker abduction and detention reportingThis indicator tracks the risk that actually falls on staff, rather than the wider conflict picture. | Any incident affecting an organisation working in the same districts. | Review movement profile, intermediary arrangements and duty-of-care briefing for affected districts. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-05 | Districts under armed-group influence | Access taxation and interference demandsInterference usually precedes either withdrawal or an unacceptable compromise, and both need a decision above field level. | Any new demand pattern in a district where programmes operate. | Escalate to country leadership, pause new commitments in that district, and record the decision. | Low |
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| SO-EW-06 | Puntland · Bari and Sanaag | ISS-attributed activity and security-force operationsActivity here moves an area that is often treated as permissive into a different planning category. | Any reported attack or sustained operation in a district with programme presence. | Reassess the area threat level and confirm whether field visits continue. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-07 | Somaliland and Puntland boundary | Boundary-district political and armed frictionBoundary flashpoints escalate quickly and cut cross-boundary movement with little notice. | Any reported mobilisation or clash affecting a route in use. | Suspend cross-boundary movement and confirm alternative access before resuming. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-08 | National | Food-security and displacement deteriorationDeterioration raises crowding, tension at distribution points and pressure on staff, which is a security matter as well as a programme one. | A published deterioration in classification for a district with programme presence. | Review distribution-site crowd management and site security arrangements. | High |
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| SO-EW-09 | National | Political and electoral disputesPolitical disputes in Somalia have repeatedly produced short-notice armed standoffs in urban areas. | Any dispute producing security-force deployment in a city with staff presence. | Hold movement in the affected city, confirm accounting for staff, and brief on stay-put arrangements. | Moderate |
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| SO-EW-10 | Air access | Air-service and airport availabilityWhere air access is the primary route, its loss removes both movement and relocation options at once. | Any suspension expected to last more than 48 hours. | Confirm overland contingency, review staffing levels in the affected location, and reassess relocation planning. | Moderate |
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