Country Risk Laboratory
SUBSTANTIALAn attack is likely.Reviewed September 2026
Kenya security risk assessment
A stable regional hub with two distinct problems: a persistent cross-border threat in the north-east and coastal hinterland, and urban crime and protest dynamics in Nairobi and Mombasa.
Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.
Operating environment
- Nairobi offices, accommodation, hotels and conference venues, and Mombasa coastal operations.
- Field movement and camp operations in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Dadaab and the Lamu hinterland.
- Long-distance road movement on the Nairobi–Mombasa, Nairobi–Garissa and northern corridors.
Threats
- Al-Shabaab activity in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and the Lamu–Boni hinterland, including roadside devices and attacks on security posts, vehicles and communications infrastructure.
- Terrorist intent against soft targets in Nairobi and Mombasa, demonstrated historically against hotels, malls and transport hubs.
- Violent urban crime, including armed carjacking and robbery, and express abduction in Nairobi.
- Protest and public-order events that can escalate rapidly, with movement disruption and force used against crowds.
- Road traffic risk, which remains the largest single cause of harm to staff nationally.
Vulnerabilities
- Routine, predictable movement patterns in Nairobi, and reliance on a small number of well-known venues.
- North-eastern field movement planned as domestic travel rather than as a cross-border threat environment.
- Driver standards and vehicle maintenance treated as a fleet matter rather than a security control.
- No agreed thresholds for pausing movement during protest activity, leaving the decision to individuals in the moment.
Operational considerations
- Two-tier movement policy: separate approval, vehicle and communications standards for north-eastern and coastal-hinterland travel.
- Road safety treated as a security control — driver assessment, defensive driving, speed limits, vehicle checks, seatbelt discipline and a night-travel ban.
- Protest thresholds written down: what triggers a movement pause, who decides, and what staff do if caught out.
- Urban crime controls: vetted transport, arrival and departure procedures, low-value carry, and a briefing that is repeated rather than issued once.
- Venue selection criteria for meetings and conferences, and short exposure at high-profile locations.
If it happens
- Casualties from an attack on a soft target or a roadside device in the north-east.
- Injury or death in a road traffic collision, statistically the most likely serious harm.
- Programme disruption and reputational consequences from an incident involving staff during unrest.
Rated risks
| Ref | Risk | L | I | Rating | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KE-A1 | Roadside device or ambush affecting movement in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera or the Lamu hinterland | 3 | 5 | SEVERE | Separate movement standard for the north-east; route assessment and road check; convoy and comms rules; abort criteria. |
| KE-A2 | Attack on a soft target used by staff in Nairobi or Mombasa | 2 | 5 | SUBSTANTIAL | Venue selection criteria; vary patterns; short exposure at high-profile sites; rehearsed incident procedure. |
| KE-A3 | Road traffic collision during staff movement | 4 | 4 | SEVERE | Driver standards and assessment; speed policy; vehicle checks; night-travel ban; journey approval. |
| KE-A4 | Violent urban crime, including carjacking or express abduction | 3 | 4 | SUBSTANTIAL | Vetted transport; arrival and departure procedures; low-value carry; area briefing repeated regularly. |
| KE-A5 | Staff caught in protest or public-order response | 3 | 3 | MODERATE | Written movement-pause thresholds; remote-working plan; avoid identified assembly points; monitoring and early notification. |
Residual risk
Medium nationally, high in the north-east and coastal hinterland. Road traffic risk carries the largest expected loss and should be managed with the same seriousness as armed threat.
Confidence
High on urban crime and road safety patterns, moderate to high on north-eastern threat activity, which is regularly reported.
Sources
- · ACLED conflict event data
- · UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
- · Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data
- · UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
- · National and regional media monitoring
- · Kenya National Police Service and NTSA public statistics
- · Kenyan national media monitoring