Country Risk Laboratory
SUBSTANTIALAn attack is likely.Reviewed September 2026
Ethiopia security risk assessment
A country where the security picture is regional rather than national: Addis Ababa functions normally while armed conflict, communication restrictions and access denial persist in parts of Amhara, Oromia and the Tigray periphery.
Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.
Operating environment
- Field offices and monitoring visits in Amhara, Oromia, Afar and the Tigray periphery.
- Long-distance road movement, including night arrival at regional towns where curfews change with little notice.
- Addis-based staff and visitors, whose day-to-day exposure is far lower but who may travel at short notice.
Threats
- Armed confrontation between federal forces and organised armed groups in parts of Amhara and Oromia, including attacks on road users and abduction for ransom.
- Unresolved tension in and around Tigray and disputed boundary areas, with the risk of renewed escalation.
- Inter-communal violence and displacement in Oromia–Somali and Afar periphery areas.
- Administrative threats to operations: movement permissions withheld, communication shutdowns, and pressure on staff of particular ethnic backgrounds.
Vulnerabilities
- Programmes designed around road movement between regional capitals, where control is not continuous.
- Reliance on mobile networks and internet for check-ins, in a context where shutdowns are used as a control measure.
- National staff exposed to identity-based pressure at checkpoints, with no written protocol for what they may and may not carry.
- Access negotiated informally with local authorities rather than through a documented, escalatable arrangement.
Operational considerations
- Region-specific movement rules rather than a single country policy: separate approval levels for Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Tigray-periphery travel.
- No night road movement; arrival deadlines set with daylight margin; overnight stops planned, not improvised.
- Communications redundancy — satellite messenger or radio where networks are unreliable — with a documented no-contact procedure.
- Written protocol for national staff at checkpoints, agreed with them, covering documentation, questioning and what to do if separated.
- Access agreements documented at the level that can enforce them, with an escalation route when local permission is withdrawn.
If it happens
- Staff injury or death from crossfire, roadside devices and armed robbery on regional roads.
- Abduction of staff for ransom, with a real prospect of long negotiation.
- Loss of programme continuity where access is withheld, and loss of situational awareness during communications shutdowns.
Rated risks
| Ref | Risk | L | I | Rating | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ET-A1 | Staff caught in armed confrontation or crossfire during regional road movement | 3 | 5 | SEVERE | Region-specific movement approval; daylight-only travel; route assessment refreshed on the day; abort criteria. |
| ET-A2 | Abduction for ransom on an Amhara or Oromia road corridor | 3 | 5 | SEVERE | Reduce predictability; low-profile vehicles and posture; restrict movement disclosure; rehearsed crisis plan. |
| ET-A3 | Loss of contact with a field team during a communications shutdown | 4 | 3 | SUBSTANTIAL | Redundant comms; pre-agreed check-in windows; no-contact procedure with escalation timings. |
| ET-A4 | Access withdrawn or permissions withheld, suspending delivery | 4 | 3 | SUBSTANTIAL | Documented access agreements; partner-led contingency delivery; pre-agreed suspension and resumption criteria. |
| ET-A5 | Identity-based pressure or detention of national staff at a checkpoint | 3 | 4 | SUBSTANTIAL | Agreed checkpoint protocol; documentation discipline; named legal and welfare support; incident reporting without blame. |
Residual risk
Medium to high in the affected regions, low to medium in Addis Ababa. Treat the country as several environments with separate residual risk statements rather than one.
Confidence
Moderate. Public event reporting is uneven across regions, and communications restrictions delay and thin the reporting that does emerge.
Sources
- · ACLED conflict event data
- · UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
- · Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data
- · UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
- · National and regional media monitoring
- · Ethiopian Human Rights Commission public statements
- · Ethiopian and diaspora media monitoring