Sudan security dashboard
An active war between two conventional forces, with urban artillery and air strikes, mass displacement, siege conditions in parts of Darfur and Kordofan, and a collapsed banking and supply environment. This is not a country-risk problem so much as a war environment: presence decisions, not mitigation measures, carry most of the risk.
Every judgement on these dashboards is an analyst reading of public reporting. Direction of travel is a judgement, not a measurement. Nothing here is live monitoring: the picture is refreshed when the desk reviews the country, and the review date is shown.
Assessed risks by severity
Analyst ratings of likelihood and impact on a five-by-five scale, scored 1–25. These are judgements from public reporting, not measured values.
- SD-A1 Staff killed or injured by indirect fire or air attack in a contested urban areaCRITICAL · 20 of 25
Likelihood Likely · Impact Severe
- SD-A2 Armed looting of premises, vehicles or warehoused stockCRITICAL · 20 of 25
Likelihood Almost certain · Impact Major
- SD-A3 Detention or interrogation of staff at a checkpoint or cross-line crossingSEVERE · 16 of 25
Likelihood Likely · Impact Major
- SD-A5 National staff and dependants left exposed after international relocationSEVERE · 16 of 25
Likelihood Likely · Impact Major
- SD-A4 Death or injury from explosive remnants of war in an area fighting has passed throughSEVERE · 15 of 25
Likelihood Possible · Impact Severe
Risk matrix
Where each rated risk sits once likelihood and impact are combined.
| Likelihood / Impact | Insignificant | Minor | Moderate | Major | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Almost certain | — | — | — | SD-A2 | — |
| Likely | — | — | — | SD-A3 SD-A5 | SD-A1 |
| Possible | — | — | — | — | SD-A4 |
| Unlikely | — | — | — | — | — |
| Rare | — | — | — | — | — |
Residual position: Extreme in the conflict-affected states. Presence should be justified activity by activity, with residual risk accepted at board level and reviewed continuously rather than quarterly.
What is driving the picture
War between SAF and RSF
Two forces with heavy weapons contesting cities, with front lines that move and no reliable deconfliction for civilian movement.
Ethnic targeting in Darfur
Reported mass atrocity against specific communities, which changes the character of risk for local staff by identity rather than by role.
Collapse of civil systems
Banking, fuel, telecommunications and health services function intermittently, so ordinary logistics become the operational risk.
External backing
Supply of materiel and money from outside actors sustains both sides and lengthens the war, and shifts in that backing show up as changes in offensive capability.
Indicator watchlist
What an analyst looks for in open reporting, and why a change in it matters for people working in the country.
| Indicator | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Front-line movement around Khartoum, El Fasher, El Obeid and the Kordofan corridors. | Determines which routes and airfields exist at all in a given month. |
| Drone and air-strike reporting away from established front lines, including Port Sudan. | Tests the assumption that any part of the country is a safe rear area. |
| Aid convoy clearance, cross-border movement from Chad and South Sudan, and visa or travel-permit practice. | The practical determinant of whether assistance reaches besieged areas. |
| Reported detention, looting of premises and interference with local staff by either force. | The most common way civilian organisations are actually harmed in this conflict. |
Actors that matter
- Sudanese Armed Forces
State military with air power, controlling shifting territory and formal authorisation channels.
- Rapid Support Forces
Paramilitary force holding large areas, associated with looting, occupation of premises and ethnic targeting.
- Aligned militias and armed movements
Local formations aligned to either side, or holding ground independently, with their own conduct.
- Civil emergency response rooms
Neighbourhood volunteer networks that carry much of the local response and are themselves targeted.
Sources and what they cannot see
- Radio Dabanga, Sudan Tribune and Sudan War Monitor reporting
- ACLED conflict event records for Sudan
- UN OCHA Sudan situation reports, IPC analysis and ReliefWeb
- Insecurity Insight and aid-worker security reporting
- Satellite-derived damage and displacement analysis published openly
Access to Darfur and Kordofan is severely constrained, so absence of reporting cannot be read as absence of violence. Both belligerents make claims that cannot be verified from open sources.
Confidence: Moderate. Reporting is credible but partial; access constraints, communications failure and the pace of front-line change mean the picture lags reality.
Operational implications
- Programme criticality review: agree in writing which activities justify presence, and stop the rest.
- Minimum footprint — no fuel or vehicle stockpiles at staffed premises; disperse stock; keep cash holdings low and documented.
- Cross-line movement only with permissions from every relevant party, confirmed the same day, with a no-go default.
- National staff support built in from the start: relocation options, salary continuity, family contact arrangements, and a decision about what is owed if international staff withdraw.
- Explosive-ordnance awareness briefing for all staff, route clearance information from mine-action actors, and a rule against entering unswept damaged buildings.
- Relocation and hibernation plans written, resourced and rehearsed, with trigger indicators agreed before they are needed.