What happened
The security trajectory across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has continued to deteriorate through 2026, with ACLED data showing sustained high levels of political violence, and JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) both reported to control or contest significant rural territory across the tri-border Liptako-Gourma area. The three military-led governments, aligned through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) after their respective withdrawals from ECOWAS, have pursued security strategies emphasising domestic and non-traditional external partnerships, notably with Russian-linked security providers, while restricting the operating space for Western military and, in several cases, humanitarian and media actors.
Reporting through 2026 indicates continued large-scale civilian casualty events, including attacks attributed to both jihadist groups and to state or allied forces during counter-insurgency operations, alongside worsening displacement figures tracked by OCHA and UNHCR across all three countries and into neighbouring coastal states.
Why it matters
The Sahel's trajectory matters for West Africa as a whole because the threat is no longer contained within the historically affected tri-border area. JNIM and, to a lesser extent, ISSP-linked cells have been reported extending attack planning and logistics networks into northern parts of Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, raising the prospect that coastal West African states — historically stable and economically significant regional hubs — face a materially higher jihadist threat over the medium term than at any point in the past decade.
The AES governments' political trajectory compounds the security concern: the withdrawal from ECOWAS and the associated realignment of security partnerships has reduced regional coordination mechanisms precisely at a moment when a cross-border threat requires more coordination, not less.
What is unfolding in the Sahel is best described as a security collapse with contained rather than absent state authority: capitals and some garrison towns remain under government control, but very large rural areas are governed, taxed and policed by armed groups in practice, regardless of the formal map. Coastal West Africa should now plan on the assumption that this pattern is diffusing toward its own northern borders, not that it will remain contained.
Political trajectory
The AES states have consolidated a shared political identity built around sovereigntist rhetoric, rejection of Western security partnerships and closer alignment with Russia-linked providers, while domestic governance indicators — press freedom, civilian oversight of security forces, tolerance of political opposition — have continued to narrow across all three countries. This has reduced avenues for external leverage or mediation and has made the security response increasingly militarised, with limited parallel investment in the governance and service-delivery deficits that regional analysts consistently identify as central drivers of recruitment into armed groups.
- Continued high tempo of JNIM and ISSP attacks across the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area, per ACLED tracking.
- Reported extension of jihadist logistics and attack planning into northern Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.
- Rising displacement figures recorded by UNHCR and OCHA across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
- Reduced ECOWAS-AES coordination on cross-border security response since the AES withdrawal.
- Continued reporting of civilian casualty incidents linked to both insurgent attacks and state or allied counter-insurgency operations.
Security implications
For organisations operating in or bordering the Sahel, the core planning implication is that the threat geography has expanded and will likely continue to do so, meaning risk assessments premised on the historical tri-border concentration are increasingly out of date. Coastal West African states should be reassessed for elevated northern-border risk even where national capitals remain low-risk, and journey management and duty-of-care frameworks for teams working near the northern borders of Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire should be upgraded in line with this trend rather than waiting for a confirmed major incident.
Business implications
Investors and companies with operations in Sahel-adjacent coastal states, particularly in extractives, agriculture and logistics near northern border regions, should factor a genuine possibility of security deterioration into medium-term planning. AES governments' realignment away from traditional Western security and development partnerships also has implications for companies and investors accustomed to operating within Western-aligned regulatory and diplomatic frameworks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger specifically, where the operating environment for Western commercial actors has become more uncertain and, in some sectors, more restricted.
NGO/humanitarian implications
Humanitarian operating space within the AES states has narrowed, with reported restrictions on international NGO registration, media access and, in some cases, direct expulsion or suspension of specific organisations. Agencies should plan for continued volatility in registration and access conditions within Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while simultaneously building anticipatory capacity in coastal states for a scenario in which displacement or direct insecurity spreads further south, a scenario several agencies are already treating as a live contingency rather than a remote possibility.
- Reassess risk ratings for northern border regions of Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire on the assumption of continued threat diffusion.
- Build anticipatory humanitarian contingency capacity in coastal West African states ahead of confirmed need.
- Monitor AES registration and access policy for INGOs as a leading indicator of operating-space risk.
- Diversify security partnerships and information-sharing arrangements given reduced ECOWAS-AES coordination.
What to monitor next
Track ACLED data for attack geography spreading further into coastal West African states; monitor AES governments' registration and operating-space policy toward INGOs and media; watch UNHCR and OCHA displacement figures for signs of cross-border flows into coastal states; and follow any shifts in ECOWAS-AES diplomatic engagement that could signal either renewed coordination or further fragmentation of the regional security architecture.