What happened
The phased drawdown of African Union and partner troop numbers in Somalia has continued through 2026, with successive handovers of forward operating bases to the Somali National Army (SNA) and allied clan militias. ACLED and ISS Africa reporting through the first half of the year has tracked a mixed picture: in some sectors, notably parts of central Somalia, government-aligned forces have held ground and continued limited offensive operations against al-Shabaab; in others, particularly in the Lower and Middle Shabelle corridors and pockets of the south, al-Shabaab has been reported regaining freedom of movement, re-establishing checkpoints and resuming taxation of trade routes that had briefly been contested.
The drawdown itself has not been linear. Troop-contributing countries have periodically paused or slowed withdrawal schedules in response to specific setbacks, including reported overruns of SNA positions and casualties among newly handed-over garrisons. UN Panel of Experts reporting and open-source tracking suggest al-Shabaab has used the transition period to consolidate financial infrastructure — checkpoints, extortion networks and informal taxation — even where it has not attempted to hold contested urban centres.
Why it matters
Somalia's security transition is widely regarded, including by regional analysts and Western governments, as the most consequential test of whether an African-led counter-insurgency force can be substituted for a domestic security architecture without a resurgence of the underlying threat. A visible reversal in Somalia would carry weight well beyond its borders: it would inform planning for other transitions being contemplated or under way elsewhere on the continent, and it would embolden an al-Shabaab leadership that has consistently framed foreign troop withdrawal as vindication of its long war of attrition.
For the immediate population, the practical effect of a security vacuum is not abstract. Areas that revert to al-Shabaab's shadow governance typically see the reintroduction of its parallel taxation and justice systems, restrictions on humanitarian access, and renewed recruitment pressure on young men in contested districts.
The drawdown was never going to be judged by the number of bases handed over on schedule; it will be judged by whether the SNA and its allied forces can hold what they are given without foreign combat support to fall back on. On current evidence, that judgement is running against the transition in several sectors, not for it.
How the threat is evolving
Al-Shabaab has adapted its posture rather than its objectives. Direct large-scale assaults on fortified AU or Somali positions remain relatively rare; instead, the group has emphasised asymmetric pressure — improvised explosive devices on supply routes, targeted assassinations of local officials and clan elders cooperating with the government, and the steady expansion of its financial base through checkpoints on roads that government forces cannot permanently secure. This financial resilience, reinforced by reported ransom and extortion income flowing through the wider Sahel-linked al-Qaeda network, gives the group staying power that is not solely dependent on battlefield gains inside Somalia.
- Reported re-establishment of al-Shabaab checkpoints and taxation on routes previously contested or cleared.
- Slowing or pausing of scheduled AU troop handovers following specific setbacks.
- Rising incidence of targeted killings of local administrators, clan elders and security officials in transition areas.
- Continued high-profile attacks in Mogadishu, indicating persistent capability to strike the capital despite territorial pressure elsewhere.
- Reports of clan militia fragmentation or local defection where government support and payment have lapsed.
Security implications
For any organisation still operating in or near Somalia, the drawdown period should be treated as a period of heightened rather than reduced risk, notwithstanding the political narrative of a stabilising transition. Route risk in the Shabelle corridors and approaches to Mogadishu should be reassessed on a rolling basis rather than against static risk maps, and journey management plans should assume checkpoint risk can reappear on routes cleared as recently as weeks earlier. International staff movement outside secured compounds in Mogadishu remains a high residual risk regardless of the wider transition narrative.
Business implications
Commercial actors with interests in Somali ports, telecoms or extractives should factor a genuine possibility of contested security gains into medium-term planning rather than assuming the drawdown proceeds as scheduled. Insurers and logistics providers serving Somali supply chains are likely to keep war-risk premiums elevated on routes through contested corridors, and taxation demands from non-state actors along supply routes should be treated as an ongoing compliance and sanctions-exposure risk rather than a one-off cost of doing business.
NGO/humanitarian implications
Humanitarian access in areas where al-Shabaab is reasserting informal control is likely to become more transactional, mirroring patterns seen elsewhere on the continent: access granted in exchange for taxation or tacit recognition rather than refused outright. Agencies should expect renewed negotiation demands in areas recently assessed as accessible, and should be cautious about programme commitments premised on continued government or AU force presence that may not hold through the transition period.
- Reassess route and area risk ratings on a rolling monthly basis rather than relying on the formal handover schedule.
- Maintain contingency plans for rapid access renegotiation in districts recently cleared of al-Shabaab presence.
- Track SNA and allied militia cohesion indicators, including reported non-payment of forces, as an early warning signal.
- Avoid overreliance on AU or government security guarantees for movement planning in transition districts.
What to monitor next
Key indicators to watch include the pace and reversibility of the AU drawdown schedule, ACLED-recorded incidence of checkpoint and taxation activity along key commercial corridors, reporting on SNA payment and cohesion problems, and any UN Panel of Experts findings on al-Shabaab's financial links to the wider al-Qaeda network in the Sahel, which would indicate the group's resource base is becoming less dependent on domestic Somali revenue alone.