What happened
Somalia's security architecture is entering a fraught phase in 2026 as the drawdown and reconfiguration of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) continues alongside patchy federal offensive operations against al-Shabaab. Reporting from ACLED and Reuters through the year has tracked a mixed picture: government-aligned clan militia (macawisley) forces have held or retaken some central Somalia districts, while al-Shabaab has demonstrated renewed capacity to mount complex attacks in and around Mogadishu and to reassert control over rural areas once forces move on. The net effect is a security map that shifts week to week rather than consolidating.
Federal government messaging has continued to frame the campaign as advancing, but independent assessments, including ISS Africa's PSC Report commentary, have been notably more cautious, pointing to overstretched Somali National Army logistics, uneven international funding for troop-contributing countries, and unresolved federal-state friction over command and resourcing.
Why it matters
The central strategic question is whether Mogadishu can hold and administer territory once it is cleared, not simply whether it can clear it. Previous phases of the campaign against al-Shabaab have repeatedly shown that offensive gains without a credible “hold” phase — local governance, policing, service delivery — tend to be reversed within months. As AUSSOM's footprint and funding continue to be renegotiated among AU, UN and bilateral partners, the risk is a security vacuum opening in precisely the districts where clearance operations have already been claimed as successes.
For a country still dependent on external military and financial support, the credibility of Somalia's own security forces to hold ground is now the single most consequential variable for the country's medium-term stability, more so than any single tactical engagement.
How the threat is evolving
Al-Shabaab has adapted rather than been degraded. The group continues to generate substantial revenue through taxation of trade routes, extortion in Mogadishu and checkpoints on key supply corridors, giving it financial resilience largely independent of territorial control. It has also shown continued capacity for high-profile attacks on hotels, security installations and government convoys, alongside a steady tempo of IED use against military and civilian vehicles on trunk roads. Clan militia mobilisation, while useful tactically, has also raised longer-term concerns about the proliferation of armed groups outside formal command structures, some of which have their own local political agendas that may not align neatly with federal objectives once fighting subsides.
The recurring failure in the Somali campaign has never been the capacity to take territory; it has been the capacity to administer it once taken. Until that changes, each clearance operation is a temporary reallocation of risk rather than a durable gain.
- Frequency and lethality of al-Shabaab attacks in and around Mogadishu as a barometer of the group's operational reach.
- AUSSOM troop-contributing country funding announcements and any further changes to mandate or force levels.
- Reports of clan militia clashes with federal forces or with each other in newly cleared districts.
- Rate of civilian administration and policing deployment behind military clearance operations.
- Al-Shabaab taxation and checkpoint activity on major supply routes as an indicator of financial resilience.
Security implications
Organisations operating in Somalia should treat any reported clearance of a district as provisional rather than durable, and should require independent verification of ground conditions rather than relying solely on government or AU statements. Road movement outside Mogadishu and regional capitals remains high risk given IED and ambush patterns, and journey management plans should assume that security status can revert quickly in areas without a substantial hold-phase presence.
Duty-of-care planning should also account for the risk that clan militia forces, while nominally allied to the government, are not always predictable or accountable actors, and their presence does not equate to the same level of assurance as a formal security force presence.
Business implications
Commercial actors with interests in Somalia's telecommunications, construction, logistics and extractives sectors face a security environment where contractual assumptions about territorial control can be overtaken quickly by events. Insurance and risk-financing arrangements should be reviewed with an assumption of continued volatility rather than a linear improvement narrative, and supply chain planning should build in redundancy for the recurring disruption of key transport corridors.
NGO/humanitarian implications
Humanitarian access negotiation in Somalia continues to require parallel engagement with federal authorities, state administrations, clan structures and, in practice, al-Shabaab itself in areas under its influence. Agencies should expect that gains in access following a clearance operation may be short-lived, and should avoid over-investing in programme infrastructure in newly cleared areas until governance and hold-phase indicators are more established.
- Require independent, dated verification of security status before authorising movement into recently cleared districts.
- Build flexible access agreements that can be renegotiated quickly as territorial control shifts.
- Diversify reliance away from single road corridors prone to IED and ambush activity.
- Track AUSSOM funding and mandate developments as a leading indicator of coverage gaps.
What to monitor next
Watch AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council sessions on AUSSOM's mandate and funding through late 2026, ACLED's Somalia event data for shifts in the geography of al-Shabaab attacks, and any federal-state agreements on security force integration, which remain a persistent structural weakness in the campaign.