Somalia in 2026 is not simply more or less dangerous than in previous years. It is differently dangerous. Security coverage has been redistributed after the AU mission transition, Al-Shabaab has adjusted its targeting, and the federal–member-state dispute has hardened into the single most consequential political risk in the country. This is our flagship read on what organisations should be watching.
Al-Shabaab
The group retains freedom of movement across much of south-central Somalia and continues to combine complex attacks in Mogadishu with assassinations, IED use on main supply routes and coercive taxation of commerce. Territory is not the metric to watch; the network, the finance and the reach of the group's shadow administration are.
Political tensions and federal–state relations
Constitutional review, the electoral model and revenue sharing remain unresolved between Mogadishu, Puntland and Jubaland. Every one of those disputes drains attention from the counter-insurgency campaign and periodically converts into checkpoint friction, permit delays and access restrictions for organisations working across member-state boundaries.
Puntland and Somaliland
Puntland's counter-ISS operations in the Cal Miskaad mountains have been militarily significant and have raised the profile of the north-east as an operating environment. Somaliland's stability advantage relative to the south remains real, but the Berbera corridor, the Ethiopia file and the Las Anod aftermath make it a political risk environment rather than a permissive one.
Mogadishu
- VBIED and complex attacks against hotels, government compounds and the airport corridor remain the design threat for facility and movement planning.
- Indirect fire against Halane and government sites is episodic but recurrent.
- Criminal risk — carjacking, armed robbery, short-duration kidnap — is systematically under-reported in organisational reporting lines.
Kidnapping and road movement
Kidnap risk to international staff is concentrated on inter-city road movement and in districts where clan authority is contested. The practical control is not armour; it is journey management discipline, credible ground truth and a rehearsed decision process for aborting movement.
Maritime security
Piracy incidents in the Somali basin have re-emerged from a very low base, coinciding with reduced naval presence as assets redeploy to the Red Sea. Fishing-vessel hijackings are the leading indicator to watch; they historically precede attempts against larger merchant traffic.
Humanitarian access and foreign military involvement
Access is negotiated locally, revoked centrally and constrained by counter-terrorism compliance. Meanwhile Türkiye, the UAE, Egypt, the United States and the AU successor mission all maintain positions in Somalia; the resulting patchwork means security guarantees vary block by block, not country by country.
Operational outlook
- Next 30 days: expect continued complex-attack attempts in Mogadishu, sustained pressure on MSRs into Lower Shabelle, and no resolution of the federal–Puntland dispute.
- Next 90 days: watch for offensive cycles in Middle Shabelle and Galmudug, further Puntland operations in the north-east, and electoral-model brinkmanship translating into administrative obstruction of NGOs.
Key indicators to watch
- Frequency of IED events on the Mogadishu–Afgoye and Mogadishu–Jowhar axes.
- Al-Shabaab statements naming international organisations or contractors.
- Puntland and Jubaland participation in — or boycott of — federal consultative processes.
- Fishing-vessel hijackings off Puntland and Galmudug.
- Changes in troop-contributing-country posture and funding for the AU successor mission.
Somalia continues to reward organisations that pair disciplined security management with genuine local access. The failure mode is not recklessness; it is the quiet reuse of last year's assumptions.